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Although many OECD countries use skilled migration to boost economic performance,
there is surprisingly little direct empirical evidence concerning what effects historical
initiatives in this area have had. This study estimates the effects of Australia’s recent shift
toward a ‘hybrid approach’ for managing economic migration, which increased the
requirements for (supply-driven) independent skilled migrants at the same time that
(demand-driven) employer-sponsored migration was expanded. We find that this
combination of policy adjustments substantively improved short-term employment
outcomes amongst skilled migrants six months after taking up permanent residency.
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Difference-in-differences1 Introduction
Skilled migration is increasingly understood as an important engine for growth, particularly
in context of declining fertility and increased longevity (e.g. Keeley 2009, Czaika and
Parsons, 2015, and Spinks, 2010, and Koleth, 2010, for Australia). There is general agree-
ment that language skills, higher education, recognition of qualifications, and social skills all
have an important influence on the labour market success of migrants (e.g. Miller and Neo
2003; Cobb-Clark 2003; Cobb-Clark et al. 2005). There is also broad agreement that
migrants entering under a skills orientated migration stream differ significantly from, and
experience more favourable labour market outcomes to, those entering under other streams
(e.g. Antecol et al. 2003; Cobb-Clark 2000; Miller 1999). In comparison, the influence on
labour market outcomes of the selection process—including the bodies responsible for
selecting successful candidates, associated eligibility criteria, and administrative structures
for processing of visa applications—has received little attention. This study sheds light on
the role of policy in this context by estimating the effects of recent changes to Australian
skilled migration policy on the short-run labour market outcomes of skilled migrants.
An influential report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2002) distin-
guishes between two models of selecting skilled migrants. The supply-driven model—typi-
cally associated with Canada, Australia and New Zealand—uses points-tests to screen in
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upon employers to identify skilled migrants who are likely to contribute positively to the
receiving economy. Although this binary categorisation helps to cut through much of the
complexity of skilled migration policy, it does not accommodate recent policy reforms in
several OECD countries.
Policy reforms implemented during the last decade suggest that the US, Canada, and
Australia are now converging towards a “hybrid” model of skilled migration that selects
migrants using both demand- and supply-driven methods (e.g. Papademetriou et al., 2008).
In the US, skilled immigration remains one aspect of policy that continues to enjoy
bi-partisan support in context of a generally hostile congress.1 There is also evidence of
growing US interest in the introduction of a points-based scheme, due to data that
reveal that the Australian and Canadian systems have successfully screened in favour of
highly skilled migrants (e.g. Koslowski, 2013, p. 28).
Canada has a long history of targeting independent skilled migrants through a points-
based system, motivated by the premise that migrants with substantial “human capital”
are best suited to adapt to evolving modern labour markets (Citizenship and Immigration
Canada 1998, p. 29). Recent reforms to Canadian immigration policy have, however,
placed greater emphasis on the short-term employment outcomes of migrants. This is in
response to growing evidence that many of its skilled migrants have struggled to find em-
ployment commensurate with their skills in the short term (e.g. Sweetman and Warman
2013; Aydemir 2011). This short term mismatch between skills and employment carries a
well-recognised long-term scarring effect for the affected migrants and hampers the
ability of the country to meet specific skill shortages through its migration programme.
In a similar vein, an Australian government audit in the late 1990’s concluded that
migrant employment outcomes six months post-arrival were predictive of labour
market outcomes in the longer term. This basic finding has had an important bearing
on Australian immigration policy through to the present day and was one motivation
for Australia’s recent shift “away from ‘supply driven’ independent skilled migration to-
wards ‘demand-driven’ outcomes in the form of employer and government-sponsored
skilled migration” (p. 4, Phillips and Spinks, 2012). As in Canada, this shift is designed
to get skilled migrants into skilled occupations quickly by better meeting the short-term
labour market needs of employers including “soft skills” that are difficult to quantify and
assess through a points-based system, e.g. Collet and Zuleeg (2008).
The evidence base underlying contemporary reforms of skilled migration policy
predominantly consists of broad statistical comparisons of the relative performance of
migrants between countries or through time. An important limitation of this evidence
base, however, is that little is known about what effects historical reforms to skilled
migration policy have had (Koslowski 2013; Lowell 2005).
In this study we estimate the labour market effects of Australian reforms implemented
between 2005 and 2009/10, which transformed Australia’s system of skilled migration
from a supply-driven into a hybrid model. The Government has credited this policy shift
as having substantially improved labour market outcomes of recent immigrants (e.g.
Bowen, 2010, 2012). Our analysis considers the empirical support for these claims.
The reforms that we consider tightened the conditions for independent skilled visas at
the same time as employer sponsored migration was being promoted by the government.
These reforms were motivated by observations that independent (supply-driven) skilled
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work in low-pay/low-skill occupations (e.g. Koleth, 2010, Spinks, 2010, Hawthorne, 2011).
We use a difference-in-differences estimation approach to consider the impact of
Australia’s shift in skilled migration policy from 2005 to 2009 on migrant employment
rates and occupational outcomes.2 We find that rates of employment six months after visa
take-up amongst selected skilled migrants increased by between 12 and 14 percentage
points, with a standard deviation of 2 percentage points. Approximately 5 percentage
points of this effect is attributable to a simple shift between (independent) supply and
(employer sponsored) demand-driven skilled migratory streams, with the remainder
accounted for by changes in the criteria used to select successful visa applicants in the
points system. We also find that occupational outcomes improved amongst independent
skilled migrants and deteriorated slightly amongst employer-sponsored migrants, leaving
the average across these two migrant categories slightly improved.
Section 2 of the paper details the reforms considered for analysis. The data and
methods that we use are described in Section 3, and empirical results are reported in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Reforms to Australian skilled migration: 1995 to 2012
Permanent immigration to Australia is primarily administered under the Migration
Programme.3 There are two major streams to the Migration Programme: the Skill Stream
is for people with skills that are likely to contribute to the Australian economy; and the
Family Stream permits reunion of immediate family members. The only other pathway to
Australian permanent residence is through the Humanitarian Programme for refugees.
The Skill Stream of the Migration Programme has grown in prominence since the
mid-1980’s. This trend accelerated from 1996, when the government announced its
intention to use skilled migration to offset population ageing due to below replacement
fertility and increased longevity.4 In this context, migratory policy has been one channel
through which the government has sought to meet “the skilled labour market needs of
the economy” (Spinks, 2010, p. 1).
Permanent additions to the Australian population have climbed fairly steadily, from
99,000 in the year to June 1996 to a historical high of 190,000 in 2006/7, a rate of
migrant arrival not matched outside of two brief peaks in 1949/50 and 1969/70. Since
then, the number of annual permanent additions to Australia has continued to grow
and was 255,000 in the most recently available data (2012/13). The methods used to
select skilled migrants have consequently been the subject of intense policy concern.
The Skill Stream of the Migration Programme is predominantly comprised of two
visa categories which are distinguished by whether an applicant is sponsored by an
Australian employer. Employer Sponsored visa applicants require a nomination from a
sponsoring employer. Sponsoring employers are required to offer a skilled position in
the applicant’s field that is full time and ongoing for a period of at least two years. The
position must pay a market salary rate, and the employer is subject to monitoring by
the Department of Immigration for a period of up to five years after they cease to be a
sponsor. Furthermore, Employer Sponsored migrants must meet minimum skill, quali-
fication, experience, and language requirements.
Skilled individuals who do not benefit from employer sponsorship can apply to
migrate independently to Australia through the General Skilled Migration (GSM)
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into account a range of characteristics, including the applicant’s age, education,
skills, occupation, experience, and language ability.
The management of skilled migration to Australia determines the number of migrants
entering through constituent visa categories and is administered via two policy levers.
The first of these is the definition of the eligibility rules for individual visa subclasses. A
less obvious, but just as important policy lever is the way that visa applications are
processed. This second aspect of the system is deliberately designed to favour some visa
subclasses relative to others by reducing processing times and permitting higher numbers
of visas granted in any year.
Employer Sponsored visas receive a higher priority for processing than GSM visas. The
number of Employer Sponsored visas granted during any year is un-capped and therefore
depends upon the number of eligible applicants and processing times. In contrast, the
number of GSM visas granted during any year is managed to meet planning numbers for
the entire Skill Stream that are issued by Government as part of the federal budget
(ending 30 June).5 This approach to processing implies interesting trade-offs between
Skill Stream visa categories. Given a fixed planning number for the Skill Stream, for
example, relaxing the eligibility criteria for Employer Sponsored visas will generally imply
a compensating tightening of the number of visas issued through the GSM category. As
these details are publicly available, they could affect the demand for alternative skilled visa
subclasses amongst prospective migrants.
Australian immigration policy has altered substantively during the last two decades
in terms of both the regulations governing specific visa subclasses and the constraints
imposed on application processing. A useful approach for cutting through the complexity
of the detailed policy reforms is to focus on historical variation observed for the numbers
and types of visa outcomes. Annual visa outcomes reported for the Migration Programme
during the period 1995/96 to 2011/12 are displayed in Fig. 1.
Figure 1 displays the expansion of the Migration Programme that has occurred since
the mid 1990’s and the extent to which this expansion has been managed through the
Skill Stream. The figure reveals that the sharpest shift in the mix between the Family
Stream and Skill Stream occurred in the three years from 1995/96 to 1997/98, following
the official announcement of a change in policy in July 1996. The share of the Skill
Stream continued to increase until 2005/06, by which time it accounted for two thirds
of all outcomes administered through the Migration Programme.
Figure 1 also indicates that between 1995/96 and 2005/06, the vast majority of the
expansion of the Skill Stream was administered through the GSM category. In
1995/96 visa outcomes in the GSM category accounted for just over half of all outcomes
administered under the Skill Stream, a fraction that climbed to almost 80% by 2005/06.
This disproportionate share of the GSM category is the reason why Australian
skilled migration could reasonably be described as “supply-driven” at that time.
However, an important shift in policy is evident from 2005/06, manifested in two
features of the data displayed in Fig. 1. First, the Family Stream has grown broadly in line
with the Skill Stream during the seven years to 2011/12 so that the relative decline of the
Family Stream between 1995/98 and 2005/06 appears to have come to an end. The Family
Stream now accounts for approximately one in every three permanent visa outcomes
administered through the Migration Programme. Secondly, there is a sharp shift evident
Fig. 1 Migration Programme outcomes by visa category, 1995/96 to 2011/12. Source: Table 2.1 DIAC (2013),
and Table 2.3 DIMIA (2004). Vertical line a represents approximate timing of Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants
to Australia 3, wave 1. Vertical line b represents approximate timing of Continuous Survey of Australia’s Migrants,
cohorts 1 and 2, wave 1. “visa outcomes” equals visas granted, less visas revoked. Statistics include all applicants
on respective visa application (primary applicants and dependents). Other (Skill Stream) comprised of Business
Skills and Distinguished Talents visa subclasses. Other (Family Stream) comprised of Parent and non-dependent
child visa subclasses
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Stream outcomes administered through the GSM category fell from approximately 80 per
cent in 2005/06 to 50 per cent since 2009/10, with most of the shift into Employer Spon-
sored visas. Contemporary data consequently suggest that Australian skilled migra-
tion is now appropriately referred to as a “hybrid” system.
The shift of the Skill Stream in favour of Employer Sponsored migrants has been
achieved by altering policy in relation to both GSM and Employer Sponsored visa
subclasses. One important and open-ended feature of reforms to skilled migration
policy is the identification of occupations that qualify for skilled migration to Australia.
These occupations are defined by official lists (e.g. the Skilled Occupation List, SOL,
and the Consolidated Sponsored Occupation List, CSOL) and are under constant
review to reflect evolving public priorities and labour market needs.
Beyond lists of eligible occupations GSM and Employer Sponsored visas have been
subject to appreciably different sets of policy initiatives. In the case of GSM visas,
attention has focussed on the specification of the points test used to identify eligible
migrants. In March 2006, Birrell et al. (2006) published a review commissioned by the
Government “to examine Australia’s selection processes for skilled migrants”. At that
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qualifications by the skilled migration system was failing to achieve desirable employ-
ment outcomes. Although onshore GSM applicants were commonly working, there
was a high incidence of low-skill/low-pay employment (see Hawthorne, 2011).
As noted by Koleth (2010), p.5, “from approximately 2005 onwards it became evident
that the interaction between the overseas student program and the general skilled
migration program was producing unintended and problematic outcomes. Issues that
emerged as a result of this nexus included: a concentration of overseas students in the
vocational education sector in the pursuit of permanent residency; the failure of some
former overseas students to achieve employment outcomes that were commensurate
with their qualifications; and failure to obtain skill levels that would meet Australia’s
skill needs.” The Birrell et al. review consequently recommended that GSM selection
criteria should place greater emphasis on English language proficiency and relevant
work experience. These recommendations were accepted by the Government, and
associated changes to policy became effective from 1 September 2007.
The required English language level was lifted from a score of 5 (vocational) to 6 (compe-
tent) on the International English Language Testing System (IELTS) scale for all applicants,
except those with recognised trade skills (who required an IELTS score of 5). Language re-
quirements for applicants in trade occupations were also increased in 2009. A substantial
fraction of prospective migrants now fail to meet the revised English language requirements
(see, e.g. Hawthorne, 2012). Furthermore points awarded for selected occupations were lim-
ited to applicants with relevant work experience, including work experience in Australia, and
work experience requirements were standardised across all offshore GSM visa subclasses.
At the same time, the list of Australian educational courses eligible for points in the
evaluation of GSM applications was tightened. Furthermore, bonus points were introduced
for applicants who were ‘proficient’ in English (IELTS band 7 or above). These changes
meant that English, rather than education in an occupation in demand, was made the key
determinant for GSM selection. Bonus points were also awarded to graduates with ad-
vanced qualifications: most notably those possessing Australian doctoral degrees (25
points) or 3-year qualifications (15 points). Post-course temporary visas were established to
provide prospective migrants with an additional 18 months to upgrade their skills for GSM
selection, by pursuing relevant work experience, improving their language skills, or complet-
ing an additional year of professional study (see Hawthorne, 2012, for related discussion).
Applicants for a GSM visa must also provide evidence that their skills are suitable for
work in Australia in their nominated occupation. Each migrant is responsible for
contacting the relevant Australian assessing authority and organising an assessment
of their skills and qualifications. Despite these conditions, however, it has been
recognised that a gap may exist between the migratory assessment and the skills or
licencing requirements demanded by Australian employers (Joint Standing Committee on
Migration 2006). Recent policy initiatives have sought to further reduce inconsistencies in
the skills assessment process and improve the information given to visa applicants.
In contrast, policy initiatives in relation to Employer Sponsored visas generally focussed
on simplifying the application procedure and facilitating the matching process between
prospective employers and interested migrants. Examples of associated activities engaged
in by the government include publicity events held both onshore and offshore and the
establishment of dedicated “outreach officers” in regional centres and amongst employers
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by reforms to fast-track Employer Sponsored permanent migration visas.
The set of reforms that have transformed the Australian system of skilled migration
from a supply-driven to a hybrid model were primarily motivated by the desire to achieve
improved labour market outcomes amongst skilled migrants, including achieving a better
match between the skills of migrants and domestic labour market needs. The reforms
have altered the focus of the skill stream in favour of English language skills and work ex-
perience while at the same time giving employers a greater say in the migrant selection
process.
When these reforms were implemented, it was unclear what effects they would
have. It seems reasonable to expect that shifting emphasis toward migrants with a
sponsoring employer should have increased rates of employment amongst Skill
Stream migrants, at least in the short-term. But what would the scale of the associ-
ated effects be? Would promoting Employer Sponsored migrants result in a deteri-
oration in the occupational distribution of the jobs held by these migrants? How
would tightening language and experience requirements affect employment outcomes
amongst individuals entering through the points-based system? These important ques-
tions remain largely unanswered and are the focus of the empirical analysis reported
below.
3 Data and empirical method
As discussed in Section 2, Australia’s system of skilled migration shifted from a supply-
driven to a hybrid model during the period between 2005 and 2009, whereas the role of
the Family Stream within the Migration Programme stabilised. Our empirical analysis fo-
cusses upon effects of the shift in skilled migration policy on short-run employment out-
comes of principal applicants six months after they were granted an onshore visa or
arrived in Australia on an offshore visa.
Our analysis compares rates of employment and rates of employment in higher
occupations reported for Skill Stream and Family Stream migrants. Minimising the
time it takes skilled migrants to find work has been a long-term policy objective in
Australia which recognises the scaring effects associated with employment gaps. Indeed
this was the initial motivation for moving beyond the supply driven model of migration
that applied up to the mid-2000s. Recent policy debate has moved beyond employment
rates to focus on ensuring that skilled migrants find work commensurate with their
qualifications and that these skills meet the needs of the domestic labour market. Our
data describe a proxy for the first of these objectives, but not the second. Furthermore,
issues concerning data comparability motivate exclusion of wages from the set of em-
ployment outcomes considered in the main body of our paper. Our analysis of wages is
consequently reported in the technical appendix; we note here that these results are
consistent with the general findings presented in Section 4.
No single data source offers the information that we require. Our study is made possible
by harmonising variables described by two complementary data sources for Australian
migrants: the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia 3 (LSIA 3) reports data for
2005, and the (recently available) Continuous Survey of Australia’s Migrants (CSAM)
reports data for 2009/10. Relative to other publicly available micro-data sources, LSIA 3
and CSAM include large samples of immigrants, are based on almost identical survey
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of a migrant’s visa subclass.3.1 Survey design and methodology
LSIA 3 and CSAM are almost identical surveys conducted by the Department of
Immigration and Citizenship. Both surveys adopt visa Primary Applicants—upon whose
characteristics a visa application is chiefly assessed—as the basic unit of analysis. The sam-
ple frames for both LSIA 3 and CSAM were drawn from the Settlement Database, which
is now maintained by the Department for Social Services. The sample populations for
both surveys were limited to Primary Applicants for permanent or provisional visas man-
aged under the Migration Programme, who were at least 18 years of age, had an
identifiable country of birth, were not New Zealand citizens, and did not have a
“special eligibility” visa (a minor visa subclass). Although both surveys only administered
questionnaires to Primary Applicants, there are a small number of questions in each
survey where Primary Applicants were asked to provide responses on behalf of other
members of the household.
The two surveys first contacted Primary Applicants who were granted an onshore
visa or arrived in Australia on an offshore visa around six months prior to the respective
survey. The sample for LSIA 3 was first surveyed between August and October 2005,
cohort 1 of CSAM was surveyed in September 2009, and cohort 2 of CSAM was surveyed
in March 20106. We consider data only for the first two cohorts of CSAM (there were five
in total), as the initial questionnaire was altered slightly for cohorts 3, 4 and 5, complicat-
ing comparisons with LSIA 3. The approximate timings of the sample windows for the re-
spective surveys are indicated by vertical lines displayed in Fig. 1.
Both LSIA 3 and CSAM include a panel dimension with an initial survey adminis-
tered as a written questionnaire that respondents completed and mailed back and a
follow-up survey conducted by telephone interview. Individuals with limited English
language ability could obtain access to interpreter services by contacting a toll free
number for the initial written surveys, and the follow-up telephone interviews were
conducted in a language that was selected using information gained through the initial
survey. The follow-up survey was administered 12 months after the initial question-
naire in LSIA 3 and six months after the initial questionnaire in CSAM. The difference
in the period between the initial and follow-up surveys reported by LSIA 3 and CSAM
limits our analysis to data collected in the first wave of both surveys.
LSIA 3 achieved a completed response rate of 49% and reports data for 9,865 principal
applicants. The initial questionnaires for CSAM achieved a similar response rate of 47%.
Cohorts 1 and 2 of CSAM together report data for 7,217 respondents.3.2 Construction of variables
The same questionnaires were administered to Primary Applicants in cohorts 1 and 2 of
CSAM, which, although very similar, are not identical to those of LSIA 3. Both CSAM
and LSIA 3 report a range of variables for Primary Applicants, including their demo-
graphic circumstances, education, employment status, receipt of government benefits, and
housing arrangements. The initial questionnaire of LSIA 3 comprises more enumerated
questions than asked in CSAM (43 relative to 35) and covers a more diverse range of
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existing social networks). In contrast, CSAM provides additional detail relative to LSIA 3
concerning the employment arrangements of the partners of Primary Applicants.
Analysis started with the publicly released sample reported for LSIA 3 and the raw
data reported for CSAM, from which we calculated a harmonised set of variables for
analysis. Some questions asked by the two surveys were identical, facilitating derivation
of harmonised data. In cases where the two surveys reported data for different, but
related characteristics, care was taken to recover common subsets of data reported by
the two surveys. Furthermore, survey non-response to questions could sometimes be
mitigated by drawing on responses to related questions. For example, missing information
to the question “do you have a partner?” could be imputed if the respondent later in the
survey stated that their partner was working. Very few observations (usually less than 1%)
were imputed in this way. A complete list of the common sub-set of harmonised data ex-
tracted from LSIA 3 and CSAM is reported in the Appendix.
3.3 Sample selection and variable summary statistics
Our analysis considers data for individuals aged 18 to 54. Applicants for Skill Stream
visas were required to be under age 45 during our period of analysis unless exempt. Our
age restriction omits 0.9% of Employer Sponsored and GSM migrants in the pooled LSIA
3/CSAM data. Additionally, our empirical analysis focusses only on migrants within the
Family, GSM, and Employer Sponsored visa subclasses. Summary statistics for the harmo-
nised variables of the population subgroups considered for analysis are reported in
Table 1.
All of the variables reported in Table 1, except for the sample sizes reported at the
bottom of the table, are dummy variables. At the top of the table (under the heading
“dependent variables”) are statistics that describe our primary focus of interest: the
(short-term) employment rates and occupational categories of Primary Applicants of
permanent or provisional visas granted for Australia. The remainder of the variables
reported in the table (under the heading “covariates”) are used to help explain the
labour market outcomes.
The characteristics described by covariates for Primary Applicants of visas granted
through the Family Stream are strikingly similar between LSIA 3 and CSAM. Only one
covariate reports a disparity between the two data sources larger than 5 percentage
points (residence in NSW, 7.2 percentage points). The average absolute difference in inci-
dence across all covariates listed in Table 1 for Family Stream migrants is 2.1 percentage
points. This finding is consistent with the fact that policy concerning the granting of the
Family Stream visas did not alter substantively over the associated time period (discussed
in Section 2). This stability in average characteristics across time further suggests that the
harmonised data are reasonably comparable between LSIA 3 and CSAM.
The distribution of occupations amongst Primary Applicants granted visas through the
Family Stream is also similar between the two surveys. Within the seven occupational
categories identified in the harmonised data, Family Stream migrants are reported to find
employment predominantly either as ‘professionals’ or ‘labourers’ in both surveys. The
proportion of these occupations is slightly higher in 2009/10 (CSAM) relative to 2005
(LSIA 3), where labourers account for just over one in every four, and professionals one in
every five of employed Family Stream migrants.
Table 1 Population averages for Primary Applicants of Family Stream and Skill Stream visas aged
18–54, by visa category and survey
Family Stream General skilled migrant Employer sponsored
LSIA 3 CSAM LSIA 3 CSAM LSIA 3 CSAM
2005 2009-10 2005 2009-10 2005 2009-10
Dependent variables
At work 0.567 0.495 0.818 0.890 0.991 0.954
Occupation (of those at work)
Higher occupations
Manager 0.068 0.066 0.042 0.050 0.148 0.130
Professional 0.178 0.197 0.392 0.455 0.549 0.477
Other occupations
Technical and trades 0.133 0.109 0.108 0.175 0.133 0.188
Community and personal 0.113 0.125 0.058 0.060 0.054 0.090
Clerical and administration 0.151 0.136 0.184 0.093 0.070 0.037
Sales 0.109 0.079 0.120 0.045 0.030 0.014
Machine operator and labourers 0.248 0.288 0.097 0.121 0.017 0.065
Covariates
Proportion women 0.669 0.693 0.442 0.376 0.301 0.294
Age bands
18-34 0.691 0.696 0.785 0.618 0.351 0.324
35-49 0.309 0.304 0.215 0.382 0.649 0.676
Has a partner 0.961 0.954 0.512 0.682 0.787 0.823
Has partner at work in Aus 0.773 0.771 0.271 0.413 0.450 0.489
Has children who migrated 0.167 0.169 0.211 0.371 0.459 0.583
Country of birth
English speaking 0.178 0.169 0.109 0.289 0.532 0.398
East Asia 0.156 0.181 0.273 0.172 0.085 0.137
South Asia 0.092 0.137 0.221 0.270 0.076 0.119
South East Asia 0.241 0.255 0.260 0.127 0.096 0.157
Speaks English very well 0.447 0.433 0.630 0.751 0.837 0.761
Qualifications
No post school qualification 0.340 0.345 0.054 0.055 0.083 0.122
First degree or higher 0.362 0.400 0.803 0.700 0.630 0.546
Highest qual obtained in Aus 0.096 0.139 0.609 0.441 0.082 0.228
Main reason for migrating
Better future for family 0.123 0.109 0.268 0.497 0.219 0.400
Join family 0.753 0.789 0.058 0.026 0.023 0.018
Work opportunities 0.035 0.017 0.298 0.170 0.470 0.356
State of residence
NSW 0.432 0.361 0.408 0.223 0.379 0.243
QLD 0.122 0.141 0.095 0.118 0.118 0.191
SA 0.044 0.052 0.036 0.120 0.118 0.079
VIC 0.286 0.307 0.341 0.312 0.207 0.225
WA 0.087 0.110 0.092 0.200 0.129 0.207
Onshore visa 0.397 0.373 0.607 0.394 0.802 0.768
Sample size 5323 1966 2933 2274 854 1713
All statistics calculated using reported survey weights
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migrants relates to the proportions of migrants at work, which fell by 7 percentage points
from 57% in the 2005 data to 50% in 2009/10. This fall coincides with the timing of the
2008 financial crisis.
Headline labour market statistics for Australia display subdued variation through the
2008 financial crisis in contrast to the sharp fluctuations observed in many OECD
countries. Seasonally adjusted employment rates for the full population, for example,
fell from a peak of 62.9% in June 2008 to a trough of 61.5% in September 2009
(cohort 1 of CSAM), before rising again to 61.7% in March 2010 (cohort 2 of
CSAM). This compares with a historical rate of 54 to 63% reported for the Australian em-
ployment rate since 1978. Similarly, the unemployment rate (full population) rose from a
historical low of 4% in August 2008 to peak at 5.9% in June 2009, before falling away to
4.9% March 2011; the unemployment rate had been as high as 11.1% during the preceding
four decades.
However, the subdued variation of headline labour market statistics masks a perceptible
rise in economic tension following the 2008 financial crisis. The “current conditions
index” of the Westpac-Melbourne Institute Survey of Consumer Sentiment, for example,
averaged 120.6 between December 2004 and March 2005 compared with 93.4 between
January and May 2009 and 108.2 between July and November 2009, where an index of
100 indicates neutrality. Employment rates of Family Stream migrants in our data follow a
similar pattern, falling from 57% in LSIA 3 to 46% in cohort 1 of CSAM, before rising
again to 53% in cohort 2 of CSAM.
Similarly, the financial crisis saw a substantive fall in job vacancies, and this has been
associated with a coincident fall in migrants entering via the temporary (457) skilled visa
category. As Cully and Pejoski (2012), p. 66, observe, “The magnitude of the peak-to-
trough decline was similar in both series, 55% for job vacancies and 61% for temporary
skilled workers. Since the trough, both series rebounded in line with improved labour
market conditions during 2010, then fell away again during 2011 as below-trend growth
in economic activity moderated the demand for labour."It seems reasonable to expect that
similar considerations affected prospective migrants in the permanent visa categories.
Compared with the 7 percentage point decline reported for the employment rate of
Family Stream migrants, our data indicate that the proportion of GSMs employed
increased by 7 percentage points from 2005 to 2009/10. There is also a trend towards
higher occupations in 2009/10 for GSMs. This provides our first indication that policy
reforms introduced as part of the shift in skilled migration policy may have resulted in
more favourable employment outcomes amongst GSMs, at least when measured relative
to migrants through the Family Stream.
Furthermore, in contrast to results for migrants through the Family Stream, the covariate
statistics reported for GSMs indicate substantial differences in average migrant characteris-
tics between 2005 and 2009/10. Relative to 2005, the sample of Primary Applicants granted
GSM visas in 2009/10 displays a stronger bias in favour of older people granted offshore
visas from English speaking countries, who speak English very well, with partners and
dependent children. The growth of offshore visas granted to GSMs is interesting because it
runs against a broad trend in favour of onshore visas granted through the Migration
Programme. There is also a decline in the share of respondents with third level education
whose highest degree was obtained in Australia.
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migrants in 2009/10 who report migrating with children and the substantively higher
share who state that their “main reason for migrating” was to provide a “better future for
(their) family” (in sharp contrast to the stability of associated responses of Family Stream
migrants). Other differences between 2005 and 2009 in the characteristics of Primary
Applicants who were granted GSM visas appear to mirror associated changes in policy.
As noted in Section 2, the points system used to determine eligibility for a GSM visa
was rebalanced in favour of English language skills and relevant labour market experience
at the relative expense of higher education qualifications (from an Australian institution).
The reduced emphasis on education meant that fewer (young) foreign students were eli-
gible for permanent residency immediately after their graduation, reducing onshore visa
grants and possibly increasing the average age and reducing educational attainment
amongst GSMs.7 There was also a shift in emphasis within the GSM visa class in favour
of state/territory sponsored migrants, who are predominantly offshore visa applicants
(see, e.g., Table 2.1, DIAC 2013).
In contrast to the statistics reported for GSMs, there is evidence of a slight decline in
employment outcomes amongst Employer Sponsored migrants between 2005 and
2009/10. This deterioration can be attributed to the fact that 99% of Employer Sponsored
migrants reported being employed in 2005, leaving almost no margin for improvement in
later years. The same, however, cannot be said for the distribution of occupations amongst
Employer Sponsored migrants in paid employment, which also displays some deterior-
ation between 2005 and 2009/10. The proportion of Employer Sponsored migrants
employed in technical, trades, and personal occupations rises by approximately the same
margin as the proportion employed as managers and professionals falls; and there is aTable 2 Estimated treatment effects on rates of employment of GSM migrants from CSAM cohort
1 to cohort 2
Sex Men Women
Visa category Family GSM Family GSM
Observations 555 1323 1284 795
Proportion employed 0.6541 0.9048 0.4252 0.8679
Linear probability model
Per cent correctly predicteda 0.6212 0.8376 0.6300 0.7943
Of those employed 0.7104 0.9102 0.5649 0.8815
Of those not employed 0.4525 0.1474 0.6781 0.2213
Treatment effectsb 0.0702 (0.0412) −0.0389 (0.0347)
Probit model
Per cent correctly predicteda 0.6276 0.8357 0.6362 0.7918
Of those employed 0.7130 0.9079 0.5737 0.8796
Of those not employed 0.4662 0.1492 0.6825 0.2152
Treatment effectsb 0.0668 (0.0402) −0.0220 (0.0251)
Source: Regressions calculated using STATA on pooled data reported for visa principal applicants in the initial waves of cohorts
1 and 2 of CSAM;
Control population refers to Family Stream migrants and treatment population to GSM; migrants treatment period is
cohort 2 reported by CSAM;
apredicted employment evaluated on basis of point estimates of relevant regression model
btreatment effect = population average impact of treatment on probability of employment for treated population in
treatment period (see Puhani, 2012) standard errors in parentheses treatment effects calculated using the “predictnl”
procedure in Stata
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sales occupations to machine operators and labourers. A consequence of these respective
shifts is that the disparities between the employment outcomes reported for GSM and
Employer Sponsored migrants generally fell between 2005 and 2009/10.
Further evidence of a convergence in outcomes of GSM and Employer Sponsored
migrants from 2005 to 2009/10 is evident throughout the list of characteristics reported
in the lower portion of Table 1. Relative to 2005, there is a smaller difference between
GSM and Employer Sponsored migrants in 2009/10 for demographics (sex, age, rela-
tionship status, and children), country of origin, Australian educational qualifications,
and geographic residence.
A potential explanation for the set of observations reported above is that many foreign
students graduating from Australian education institutions—particularly those with
weaker labour market prospects—who would have applied for a GSM visa in 2005, may
have chosen instead to apply for an Employer Sponsored visa in 2009/10. This explanation
would be consistent with coincident changes to immigration policy for GSM applicants
that were targeted at international students (including tightening of language and educa-
tional conditions; e.g. Hawthorne, 2011).
Nevertheless, the timing of our data suggests that—although the reforms to GSM visas
may have screened out foreign graduates with the weakest labour market prospects from
that visa stream—it is unlikely that these prospective migrants took up employer sponsored
visas during the same period. Employer sponsored visa applicants typically require a mini-
mum of 3 years work experience in their nominated occupation, and most recent graduates
in our sample are unlikely to have met this criterion in 2010 (e.g. Birrell and Healy, 2010).
Data reported by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (2014) reveal
that the share of (permanent) skilled visas granted to temporary student visa holders
declined from 26% in 2007/8 to 8% in 2009/10. There was a coincident increase in the
proportion of student visa holders granted a Temporary Graduate visa 485 (introduced in
2007) from 0.3% in 2007/08 to close to 20% in 2009/10. Furthermore, there was no
change in the proportion of student visa holders granted a family visa, an employer spon-
sored visa, or a temporary skilled work visa. The vast majority of employer sponsored
visas are awarded to individuals who had previously held a temporary skilled 457 working
visa. These summary statistics indicate that most overseas student visa holders moved
from GSM to Temporary Graduate Working 485 visas between 2007/8 and 2009/10 and
are not among skilled visa holders in our data for 2009/10.
Comparisons between the sample sizes that are reported at the bottom of Table 1
and national aggregates are complicated by the fact that our samples reported for 2005
and 2009/10 focus exclusively on Primary Applicants, whereas national aggregates typ-
ically include associated dependents. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider how the raw
samples compare, if only to provide an imperfect yardstick for interpreting the empirical
analysis reported in Section 4. A key issue in this regard concerns the contribution to the
Skill Stream made by the GSM and Employer Sponsored visa categories. Table 1 indicates
that the GSM sample accounted for 77% of all GSM and Employer Sponsored Primary
Applicants reported by LSIA 3, and for 57% of the sample reported by cohorts 1 and 2 of
CSAM. These proportions are close to those implied by data reported in Table 2.1 of
DIAC (2013), which reports that GSMs accounted for 83% of all GSM and Employer
Sponsored visa outcomes in 2005/06, and 59% of outcomes in 2009/10.
van de Ven and Voitchovsky IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:22 Page 14 of 283.4 Empirical approach
We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy to estimate the effects of reforms to
skilled migration policy implemented between 2005 and 2009 on the short-run labour
market outcomes of skilled migrants to Australia. Our treatment group includes GSMs in
isolation and is pooled with Employer Sponsored migrants. Our control group is com-
prised of Family Stream migrants. Pre-treatment outcomes are described by data reported
for 2005, and post-treatment outcomes by data reported for 2009/10. We consider two
binary employment outcomes: “at work” and “working in a higher occupation”.8 We re-
port estimates for a probit specification (see e.g. Puhani, 2012), noting that results are
qualitatively the same if a linear probability specification is used (results can be obtained
from the authors upon request).
Table 1 indicates that approximately 80 of GSMs and 99% of Employer Sponsored
migrants were reported as being employed in 2005. These high rates of employment
raise the question of whether there was much scope for improvement following the con-
sidered policy reforms (e.g. Blundell and Hoynes, 2004, criticising Eissa and Liebman
1996). Our analysis of employment rates is motivated by two observations. First, a key
objective of changes implemented to the eligibility criteria of GSM visas was to improve
the match between migrant characteristics and the needs of Australian employers. With
one in five GSMs indicated as not employed in 2005, there appears sufficient scope for
some improvement to have been achieved in this regard.
Secondly, as noted in the preceding subsection, a sharp deterioration in market senti-
ment was observed between 2005 and 2009. This deterioration may have dampened
short-term employment prospects, which provides a possible explanation for the reduced
rates of employment reported for Family Stream migrants during the same period. If true,
then this consideration would widen the scope for finding a positive effect of policy on
employment rates amongst Skill Stream migrants between 2005 and 2009.
A key issue of concern in relation to any DiD analysis is whether the assumed control
population provides a valid basis for screening out the effects on the treatment population
of unobserved changes to the economic environment that were coincident with the treat-
ment. Options for testing the validity of Family Stream migrants as a control population
for Skill Stream migrants are constrained in our context due the dynamic nature of
Australian migration policy and the limited data that are available. Our confidence in the
results that we report is based on four key sets of observations.
First, the covariate statistics listed in Table 1 display temporal variation that is
consistent with the nature of policy reforms implemented between 2006 and 2009 and is
not obviously a product of the 2008 Financial Crisis.
Secondly, an initial concern that we had was that Family Stream migrants might be
disproportionately sensitive to the underlying economic environment, relative to other
population subgroups (including Skill Stream migrants). This does not appear to be the
case in our context. Data reported by the Education and Work Survey (EWS) conducted
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, for example, permit rates of employment to be
calculated for graduates of Australian education institutions who were aged 23 and left
full-time education from age 22.9 These statistics are interesting because they relate to a
population who was in the Australian labour market for a comparable period of time to
that of migrants reported in the initial waves of LSIA 3 and CSAM. The focus on indivi-
duals who left full-time education at an advanced age is also consistent with our interest in
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rate for recent graduates was 80% in 2005 and 73% in 2009. The implied fall of 7 percent-
age points is identical to that described for Family Stream migrants by LSIA 3 and CSAM
data during the same period (see Table 1).
Thirdly, Table 1 indicates that our treatment and control populations exhibit potentially
important compositional differences. Family Stream migrants are predominantly married
and female, whereas Skill Stream migrants display greater variation for marital status and
are disproportionately male. Our analysis is designed to accommodate these compos-
itional differences by estimating separate specifications for men and women and by
including controls for marital status, children, and onshore visa dummy variables in all of
the specifications that we report.10
Finally, we conducted a limited out-of-sample test for the validity of Family Stream
migrants as a control population for Skill Stream migrants by calculating treatment
effects from CSAM cohort 1 to cohort 2. Although some policy variation between
cohorts 1 and 2 of CSAM is inevitable, it is reasonable to suppose that this variation is
relatively minor. In contrast, buoyancy of the economy did appear to increase sharply
between September 2009 and March 2010, as indicated by measures of consumer senti-
ment (see Fig. 2 for associated detail). As discussed in Section 3.3, employment rates of
Family Stream migrants reported for cohorts 1 and 2 of CSAM also increased substantially
during this period, by 7 percentage points.
The DiD estimation approach is designed to screen out precisely the type of eco-
nomic fluctuation that is referred to in the preceding paragraph. We consequently
tested the underlying assumptions of the approach by estimating treatment effects for
employment rates of GSMs between cohorts 1 and 2 of CSAM. If the assumptions of
the model are valid, then estimated treatment effects between cohorts 1 and 2 of
CSAM should be insignificant. Selected results are reported in Table 2.
Population sizes are reported for the four population subgroups distinguished by gender
and visa category. These statistics are reported because they imposed an importantFig. 2 Consumer sentiment and survey sampling windows. Source: Westpac-Melbourne Institute Survey of
Consumer Sentiment. A sentiment index of 100 indicates neutrality in responses to sentiment questionnaire.
Highlighted series indicate windows during which respondents to respective surveys (LSIA 3; CSAM cohort 1 or
cohort 2) may have taken-up a permanent or provisional visa to reside in Australia
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and still obtain reliable regression estimates. The next row of Table 2 describes employ-
ment rates for the individual population subgroups, and reflects associated summary
statistics reported in Table 1. The remainder of the table is divided in two halves, one
reporting regression statistics derived from a linear probability model, and another for a
probit specification. This is the only table where we report both models, noting that—as
in Table 2—qualitatively similar results are derived throughout the study using the two re-
gression specifications.
The treatment effects reported in Table 2 are all not significantly different from
zero at the 95% confidence interval. Although the effects for men are (just) signifi-
cant at the 90% confidence interval, those for women are not significant at any
reasonable confidence interval. Hence, the results that we report here do not reject
the assumptions underlying our DiD approach, although there is some evidence to
suggest that caution should be exercised when interpreting the results reported for
men.
One potential issue with our use of a DiD empirical approach is that the reforms to
skilled migration policy may have influenced the composition of migrants through the
Family and Skill Streams. It is possible, for example, that increasing the conditions for
eligibility of the GSM visa category encouraged some individuals to apply for a visa
through the Family Stream. We cannot test for this sort of phenomenon, as we do
know which Family Stream migrants would have applied through the GSM category
prior to the shift in policy. Nevertheless, we expect that this consideration—to the
extent that it exists—is likely to dampen the estimated treatment effects with which we
are concerned.
A DiD empirical approach has the added advantage in the current context of
accommodating non-random survey response that may affect the data reported by
LSIA 3 and CSAM. The initial response rates achieved for LSIA 3 and CSAM are not con-
spicuously lower than those achieved by general population surveys in which participation
is voluntary.11 Nevertheless, there is some cause for concern regarding the representative
nature of the data that are reported by these surveys. As the technical report for CSAM ac-
knowledges, although interpreter services were provided as part of each survey’s roll-out,
“migrants from Non-English speaking backgrounds may have found the form difficult to
complete” (Smith et al., 2012, p.21). In this regard, it is important to note that LSIA3 and
CSAM employed identical sample and survey methods so that any non-random response
is likely to have affected both surveys in a similar way. By focussing on differences taken
over comparable survey instruments, we identify effects that can be meaningfully inter-
preted as valid for a consistent migrant subgroup, even if this “migrant subgroup” is not
fully representative of all Australian immigrants.
4 Empirical results
As discussed in Section 3, our analysis explores the influence of policy on two key
labour market outcomes of skilled migrants to Australia. Section 4.1 quantifies the
impact of the shift in skilled migration policy on rates of paid employment. Section 4.2
extends our analysis to consider the influence of the policy change on the occupational
distribution of employed migrants. This second set of results helps us to determine
how tightening of eligibility requirements for GSM visas and promoting Employer
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Discussion is framed around a series of nested regressions that are designed to draw
out how changes to the selection criteria for GSM visa subclasses influenced employ-
ment outcomes, contributing to the screening literature following Miller (1999). These
two margins focus on the stated objectives of the policy reforms: to facilitate rapid
labour market integration of skilled migrants.124.1 Analysis of employment rates
Selected results from our analysis of employment rates are reported in Table 3, and full
results are reported in the technical appendix. Measures of fit are reported in the top
half of the table, and the lower half of the table reports regression statistics for treatment
effects, which we interpret here as being attributable to changes to Skill Stream migration
policy implemented between 2005 and 2009. All regression specifications include full
interaction effects with a gender dummy. This permits separate treatment effects to be
evaluated for men and women, in addition to the treatment effects for the population on
average. The left-hand panel of the table reports statistics where the treatment population
is comprised exclusively of GSM outcomes, and the right-hand panel reports results when
GSM and Employer Sponsored migrants are pooled.
Reading across the estimated treatment effects reported in Table 3 indicates that the
shift in Australian skilled migration policy between 2005 and 2009 resulted in significantlyTable 3 Selected difference in differences probit regression statistics for the incidence of
employment of Primary Applicants of Family Stream and Skill Stream visas aged 18-54
Treatment population GSMs only GSM and employer sponsored migrants
Regression specification 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Per cent correctly predicteda 0.7502 0.7719 0.7723 0.7758 0.7854 0.8044 0.8057 0.8083
Of those employed 0.8441 0.8895 0.8837 0.8805 0.8840 0.9133 0.9082 0.9082
Of those not employed 0.5550 0.5275 0.5409 0.5584 0.5261 0.5181 0.5362 0.5456
Likelihood −6211.1 −5846.8 −5803.2 −5753.2 −6612.5 −6197.4 −6155.7 −6101.6
R2 0.1772 0.2255 0.2313 0.2379 0.2182 0.2673 0.2722 0.2786
Treatment effectsb 0.1437 0.1158 0.1144 0.1081 0.1205 0.0936 0.0895 0.0853
(0.0248) (0.0257) (0.0263) (0.0275) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0208) (0.0218)
For men 0.1526 0.1289 0.1229 0.1094 0.1162 0.0938 0.0867 0.0788
(0.0263) (0.0273) (0.0279) (0.0288) (0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0212) (0.0218)
For women 0.1287 0.0941 0.1003 0.1060 0.1288 0.0934 0.0949 0.0979
(0.0224) (0.0229) (0.0235) (0.0253) (0.0192) (0.0195) (0.0200) (0.0217)
Source: Regressions calculated using STATA on pooled data reported for visa principal applicants in the initial waves of
LSIA 3 and cohorts 1 and 2 of CSAM;
Control population refers to Family Stream migrants and treatment period reported by CSAM data standard errors in
parentheses; pooled sample size is 11,973 for Family Stream and GSM migrants, and 14,367 for Family Stream, GSM and
Employer Sponsored migrants; proportion of pooled sample employed is 67.5% for GSMs only, and 72.4% for GSM and
Employer Sponsored migrants; treatment effect calculated by evaluating predicted probabilities of employment implied
by the estimated model, via the “predictnl” Stata command; all models interact all covariates with the gender dummy
variable; specification 1 includes covariates for marriage, employed spouse, dependent children, onshore visa, and time
in Australia; specification 2 augments specification 1 to include English language and age covariates; specification 3
augments specification 2 to include education qualifications covariates; specification 4 augments specification 3 to
include a wide range of covariates including reasons for migrating, country of origin and state of residence;
aPredicted employment evaluated using threshold probability of 50%;
bTreatment effect = population average impact of treatment on probability of employment for treated population in
treatment period (see Puhani, 2012)
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indicate increases in average rates of employment of 10–15 percentage points for Skill
Stream migrants, subject to standard deviations of 2–3 percentage points. These results
are quite substantial, especially given that employment rates amongst GSMs and
Employer Sponsored migrants were in excess of 80% in the 2005 data (see Table 1). Similar
treatment effects are estimated for men and women, and in no specification are the differ-
ences statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval.
Extending the treatment population to include Employer Sponsored migrants
tends to dampen the estimated treatment effects, but otherwise leaves the pattern
of treatment effects across regression specifications unchanged. This is true for
both population average and gender specific effects. The dampening identified here
may appear to contradict the shift in emphasis of skilled migration in favour of
Employer Sponsored migrants, who must obtain an offer of employment prior to
submitting their visa application. It is, however, a consequence of the dispropor-
tionate improvement in employment rates amongst GSMs.
As noted previously, approximately one in every four visas issued through GSM
and Employer Sponsored categories was re-allocated from the GSM to the Employer
Sponsored category between 2005 and 2009. Furthermore, the employment rate
observed for GSMs in 2005 is approximately 0.8, whereas for Employer Sponsored
migrants it is close to 1.0. Hence, all else being equal, the shift in weight toward
demand-driven Employer Sponsored visas should have increased employment rates
by around 5 percentage points (= 0.2 × 0.25). As the treatment effects calculated for
GSMs are significantly greater than 5 percentage points, augmenting the regression
sample to include Employer Sponsored migrants dampens the magnitude of the esti-
mated treatment effects.
Four nested regression specifications are reported in Table 3, with higher numbered
specifications augmenting the set of covariates in a way that is designed to draw out
the influence of selected changes implemented to GSM policy.
As noted in Section 3.4, we allow for important compositional differences between
our treatment and control populations by including in all regression specifications
controls for marriage, dependent children, employed spouses, and onshore visa appli-
cants, in addition to full interactions with a gender dummy. Beyond this basic set of
controls, the only characteristics included in specification 1 are the dummy variables
that are required for a DiD analysis. This restricted specification is designed to identify
a “full” measure of the effects of policy on employment rates on the assumption that
policy drives all other temporal variation in underlying characteristics between Family
Stream and Skill Stream migrants. The estimates reported in Table 3 for specification 1
indicate full treatment effects of approximately 14 percentage points for GSMs in isola-
tion and 12 percentage points for GSMs pooled with Employer Sponsored migrants.
Specification 2 introduces controls to account for the effects of English language
proficiency and experience (proxied by age), which were assigned greater significance in
the evaluation of GSM visas between 2005 and 2009. Comparing the estimated treatment
effects reported for specification 1 with specification 2 indicates that allowing for observed
changes in English language and age reduces the (unexplained) treatment effect by just
over 2 percentage points for men, 3.5 percentage points for women, and 2.7 percentage
points on average. Although these differences are not statistically significant at the 95 per
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and age amongst GSMs relative to Family Stream migrants (discussed in Section 3). The
results reported here consequently suggest that accounting for the influence of policy on
English language and experience can explain approximately one fifth of the total effect on
average employment rates of policy change between 2005 and 2009, rising to approxi-
mately one quarter of effects estimated for women. Furthermore, related analysis suggests
that our proxies for English proficiency (self-reported) and experience (age) are likely to
understate the true variation of these characteristics during our sample period (see van de
Ven and Voitchovsky, 2015).
The measures of fit reported for each specification indicate that introducing age and
English language proficiency improves the regression model’s capacity to explain the
reported incidence of employment without deteriorating its capacity to explain the
reported incidence of non-employment. In contrast, augmenting the set of covariates to
include controls for education (specification 3), demographics, and migratory circum-
stances (specification 4) has relatively little impact on the model’s explanatory power.
Specification 3 adds covariates for education, which provides a nice counter-point to
specification 2 as education was made relatively less prominent in the selection criteria
for GSMs between 2005 and 2009. Introducing educational controls has almost no impact
on the estimated treatment effects relative to regression specification 2. This result is con-
sequently broadly supportive of the shift in emphasis in favour of English language skills
and experience.
Introducing a broad range of alternative explanatory variables for employment in
regression specification 4 generally results in a marginal reduction of the estimated
treatment effects, with none of the differences with specifications 2 or 3 exceeding
a single standard deviation. The largest deviations are reported for men, amongst
whom the wide range of additional controls included in specification 4 help to ex-
plain approximately 1 percentage point of the estimated treatment effect relative to
specification 3.
The set of covariates that we include for analysis can consequently explain only
a fraction of the aggregate treatment effect reported for employment outcomes of
Skill Stream migrants observed between 2005 and 2009. In part, this is a reflection
of the limited set of harmonised characteristics that are available for analysis. It is
also a clear indication of how important nuanced factors that extend beyond stan-
dardised language tests and measures of experience are for administering migration
policy. Establishment of effective pathways to permanent residence (e.g. the facilita-
tion of conversion from temporary student to independent skilled migrant status),
occupational restrictions that are tailored to local labour market conditions, and
processes that distinguish useful qualifications and experience are all likely to be
important to ensure that migrants “hit the ground running” from a labour market
perspective.
4.2 Analysis of occupational outcomes
Our empirical analysis of occupational outcomes mirrors that reported for employment
rates. Here, however, we focus exclusively on Primary Applicants who were reported to
be in paid employment. Furthermore, to facilitate interpretation of results we consider
two occupational groups, with the higher occupational group including “managers” and
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change in the probability of employment in a higher occupation, given employment,
amongst Skill Stream migrants in 2009/10. As in section 4.1, all regression specifications
include controls for marriage, dependent children, employed spouses, and onshore visa
applicants, in addition to full interactions with a gender dummy.
Empirical results for the incidence of higher occupations are presented in Table 4 in
the same format as for employment rates in Table 3. Many of the estimated statistics
reported in Table 4 display close similarities with those reported in Table 3. The
current discussion consequently focusses upon key issues of interest and important
deviations from the results discussed in Section 4.1.
Estimates reported for the treatment effects indicate that the probability of being
employed in a higher occupation tended to increase for employed Skill Stream
migrants between 2005 and 2009 as a consequence of changes to skilled migration
policy. The scale of the effects reported for higher occupations is, however, appre-
ciably smaller than the effects reported for employment rates in Table 3, and some
population average effects are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence
interval.
The treatment effects that are reported for higher occupations are sensitive to
both gender and the occupational categorisation that is considered. In terms of
gender, the estimated treatment effects for women are approximately twice as large
as for men and are almost all statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval
(in contrast to the estimates for men). Furthermore, expanding the definition of
higher occupations to include “technical and trades” together with managers and
professionals (not reported here) produces treatment effects that are highly significant
and of comparable magnitudes to the effects reported for employment rates. This
sensitivity to the inclusion of technical and trades occupations is to be expected
given the statistics reported in Table 1. Table 1 indicates that the proportion of
Family Stream migrants employed in technical and trades occupations fell by 2
percentage points between 2005 and 2009, whereas it increased by 7 percentageTable 4 Selected difference in differences probit regression statistics for higher occupational
classification of employed primary applicants of Family Stream and Skill Stream visas aged 18-54
Treatment population GSMs only GSM and employer sponsored migrants
Regression specification 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Per cent correctly predicteda 0.6505 0.6654 0.7201 0.7289 0.6382 0.6656 0.7120 0.7278
Of those employed 0.2304 0.3257 0.5213 0.5375 0.5807 0.5989 0.6411 0.6486
Of those not employed 0.8911 0.8600 0.8340 0.8385 0.6811 0.7154 0.7649 0.7869
Likelihood −4981.5 −4739.5 −4358.2 −4274.4 −6502.4 −6187.3 −5627.9 −5519.7
R2 0.0487 0.0949 0.1677 0.1837 0.0749 0.1198 0.1994 0.2148
Treatment effectsb 0.0655 0.0662 0.0800 0.0984 0.0528 0.0469 0.0583 0.0692
(0.0376) (0.0384) (0.0364) (0.0361) (0.0347) (0.0353) (0.0326) (0.0323)
For men 0.0383 0.0511 0.0704 0.0960 0.0361 0.0376 0.0527 0.0679
(0.0375) (0.0389) (0.0360) (0.0354) (0.0350) (0.0359) (0.0321) (0.0316)
For women 0.1126 0.0924 0.0967 0.1026 0.0857 0.0655 0.0694 0.0717
(0.0377) (0.0376) (0.0372) (0.0374) (0.0343) (0.0340) (0.0335) (0.0336)
As for Table 3
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migrants.
Comparing the treatment effects reported in the left and right panels of Table 4
reveals larger (positive) effects estimated for GSMs taken in isolation than for GSM
and Employer Sponsored migrants taken together. These results are consistent with the
occupational distributions reported in Table 1, which indicate an increase of 7 percentage
points in the proportion of employed GSMs working as managers or professionals
compared with a decrease of 9 percentage points for Employer Sponsored mi-
grants. Our results consequently suggest that changes to skilled migration policy
achieved improved occupational outcomes amongst GSMs and Employer Sponsored
migrants taken as a group, with particularly strong effects estimated for women in
the GSM visa category.
The treatment effects reported for the nested regression specifications are similar
to those reported in Table 3 in the sense that none of the differences within popu-
lation groups (men/women/all) are statistically significant at the 95% confidence
interval. Focussing on the point estimates for treatment effects of women—which
are consistently larger than those for men—also reveals similar variation between
regression specifications to the variation reported in Table 3. Treatment effects for
women fall by approximately one fifth when language and age are added in specification 2,
then climb marginally when education controls are included (from specification 2
to 3), and climb again when a broad range of controls are included (from specifi-
cation 3 to 4).
Of all the regression specifications only those for specification 4 are robustly
significant across treatment populations (GSMs only/GSM and Employer Spon-
sored/male/female/combined). These results suggest that, once all of the observed
characteristics are taken into consideration, changes to skill migration policy that
are not represented by the set of covariates resulted in a significantly higher
probability of employment in a higher occupation for employed Skill Stream
migrants.
Taken together with the results reported in Section 4.1, our analysis conse-
quently suggests that changes to skilled migration policy resulted in improved
employment rates during our period of analysis without compromising the dis-
tribution of occupations amongst skilled migrants, on average. Tightening the
eligibility conditions for GSM visas is found to have unambiguously improved
both rates of employment and employment in higher occupations of skilled mi-
grants. However, the fact that these effects are subdued for GSM and Employer
Sponsored migrants in aggregate, compared with results for GSMs only, suggests
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the reforms to skilled migration policy
that were implemented between 2005 and 2009, which tightened the eligibility
criteria for GSM visas and promoted Employer Sponsored migration, motivated
lower skilled migrants to apply through the Employer Sponsored category.13
One key implication of the above observations is that outsourcing migrant se-
lection to employers may ensure high short-term employment rates among immi-
grants but may imply a trade-off along other dimensions. This is important as
employer sponsored migration is commonly found to select migrants with sys-
tematically different characteristics to those favoured by points based systems
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gested that tightening independent channels to permanent residency while at the
same time expanding the role of employer sponsorship may see a rise in exploit-
ative employment arrangements (Birrell and Healy, 2010), an issue that is compli-
cated by the relative opacity of employer sponsored selection.
These observations suggest that careful attention should be paid to the eligi-
bility criteria applied for Employer Sponsored migrants. Recent Australian evi-
dence in support of this conclusion is reported by Birrell and Healy (2014) and
is typified by differences in the skill composition of migrants selected by, for
example, the Canadian and US immigration systems (e.g. Borjas, 1993). It is
probable that further policy adjustment in this vein will be warranted in the
medium term.
Many of the caveats raised by the above discussion could be explored with data
that tracks migrants for a longer period than is considered here. Unfortunately the
data that we use are not well suited to undertake such an analysis. Exploratory
statistics based on data reported for the follow-up interviews administered by LSIA
3 (1 year later) and CSAM (6 months later) broadly suggest that differences be-
tween migratory streams observed 6 months after arrival persist into the medium
term. Further research of these issues is required.
5 Conclusions
Recognition of skilled immigration as a driver of economic growth focusses
attention on policies that manage the skilled migrant intake. Recent international
trends in skilled migration policy have converged toward so-called hybrid sys-
tems in which both supply-driven independent migration and demand-driven
employer sponsored migration play significant roles. This study empirically eval-
uates the influence that Australia’s shift from a supply driven system in 2005
toward a hybrid system in 2009 had on the short-term labour market outcomes
of migrants.
We find that rates of employment amongst GSM and Employer Sponsored skilled
migrants increased statistically significantly by between 12 and 14 percentage
points as a result of the shift in policy (slightly larger effects were estimated for
GSMs in isolation). Approximately 5 percentage points of this aggregate effect can
be attributed to a shift in emphasis of the system in favour of Employer Sponsored
migration. The remainder of the effect on employment rates can be attributed to
changes in the eligibility criteria for GSM category visas, which were designed to
achieve a better match between independent GSM characteristics and the needs of
Australian employers.
Important reforms implemented to the eligibility criteria for GSM category visas
included increasing English language requirements for a broad range of visas (from
IELTS 5, vocational, to 6, competent), adapting qualifying occupation lists in
response to changing labour market needs, and shifting emphasis of the points-
based system in favour of experience at the expense of education. We find that
controlling for self-reported migrant language skills and age (to proxy experience)
helps to explain approximately 3 percentage points of the aggregate effect of pol-
icy on employment rates amongst Skill Stream migrants. Including additional
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effects that we estimate. This leaves approximately 4 percentage points of the over-
all effect on employment rates attributable to other uncontrolled aspects of policy
change (see Section 2), including alterations to qualifying occupations and the
imperfect nature of age as a proxy for experience.
Amongst the subset of GSMs who report being employed, we find that the shift
in skilled migration policy between 2005 and 2009 increased rates of employment
in managerial and professional occupations significantly, by 6 percentage points on
average, with larger effects identified for women (11 percentage points) than for
men (4 percentage points). Controlling for changes in language skills and age helps
to explain approximately 4 percentage points of this increase for women, although
this is entirely offset after controls for education are included in the regression.
Approximately 5 percentage points of the increase in the incidence of managers
and professionals amongst all GSM migrants can be attributed to other uncon-
trolled factors.
Extending the analysis to consider the effects of changes to skilled migration
policy on the occupational classifications of GSM and Employer Sponsored mi-
grants as a group results in smaller point estimates that, though positive, are
not statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. Taken together with
our other results, our analysis consequently suggests that Australia’s shift from a
supply-driven to a hybrid system of skilled migration significantly improved
rates of employment amongst skilled migrants without compromising their occu-
pational distribution on average. This is an important result, particularly when it
is recognised that employment rates amongst GSM and Employer Sponsored mi-
grants were in excess of 80% prior to the changes in policy.
Our results suggest an interesting interpretation of Australia’s 2005 to 2009 shift to a
hybrid system of skilled migration. The changes implemented to policy tightened the
conditions for independent skilled migration at the same time as demand-driven em-
ployer sponsored migration was being actively promoted by the government. Our esti-
mates indicate that tightening of the independent GSM visa category successfully
screened in favour of migrants who exhibited both higher rates of employment in their
first 6 months after take-up of a visa and higher rates of employment as either man-
agers or professionals.
However, our finding of a smaller improvement in the rate of employment as
managers or professions amongst GSM and Employer Sponsored migrants as a
group suggests that some migrants with weaker labour market skills may have
applied for entry to Australia through the Employer Sponsored rather than the
GSM category as a result of the shift in policy. Seen from this perspective, Aus-
tralia’s hybrid system of skilled migration can be understood as selecting the
strongest candidates for independent skilled migration and requiring weaker can-
didates to find a sponsoring employer as a pre-condition for the granting of a
permanent visa.14 Our estimates suggest that this approach to policy has helped
to improve significantly the short-run employment outcomes of skilled migrants.
Of course, the influence on the Australian economy of the aggregate scale of
the skilled migrant intake is a more complex question that our analysis does
not touch upon and which remains for further research.
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1Two pieces of bipartisan legislation are currently before congress, one of which
seeks to expand the cap on temporary skilled migration from 65,000 up to 195,000
(in special circumstances), and the other to facilitate immigration by entrepreneurs.
2Wages are omitted from our central analysis as the associated data appear less
robust. Nevertheless, analysis of the wage data are generally consistent with our
findings for employment and occupation and are reported in the technical appen-
dix. Note also that we do not consider questions concerning the aggregate scale of
the skilled migrant intake, which are often the subject of heated public debate
(e.g., Birrell, 2014).
3Migration to Australia is increasingly a two-stage process, whereby a period is spent
on temporary visas before a prospective migrant transitions onto a permanent visa cat-
egory. This paper focuses on policy changes in relation to permanent visas.
4See, e.g., comment by James Fox, First Assistant Secretary, Migration and Temporary
Entry Division, reported in Birrell et al. (2006), p. 10, and the Ministerial “Forward” to
annual editions of Australia’s Migration Trends (Population Flows prior to 2011/12),
reported by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
5Among GSM applicants those with skills identified on critical shortage lists also
have higher processing priority.
6Both cohorts 1 and 2 of CSAM report data for primary applicants who ar-
rived in a four month window centred about 6 months (4–8 months) prior to
respective survey (see Smith et al., 2012). LSIA 3 reports data for primary ap-
plicants who were surveyed six months after they were granted an onshore visa
or arrived in Australia on an offshore visa (see DIAC, 2007).
7It is possible that some of the individuals reported in CSAM held one of the
new temporary working (485) visas prior to being granted a permanent resi-
dency visa (and entering the CSAM sample frame). Note that as the new tem-
porary working visa matures, it may be that the average educational attainment
of GSMs will rise to levels similar to those observed in 2005.
8Wages are considered in the technical appendix.
9The same analysis cannot be conducted for other age groups due to the age bands
reported by the Education and Work Survey.
10Our results are qualitatively unaffected if separate estimates are calculated for each
of the four population subgroups defined by sex and onshore/offshore visas. We focus
on separate estimates for sex here, as population sample sizes become small for some
groups when more detailed population subdivisions are considered.
11The response rate achieved for the Australian Survey of Income and Housing 2010/11,
for example, was 67 per cent (including out of scope households), and for the UK Living
Cost and Food Survey 2010 was 50%.
12There are other margins of interest in relation to any migration programme, but
these are not discussed here.
13Indeed, this was the motivation for introduction of the 485 temporary working visa
for overseas students.
14The system has also been adapted to facilitate the pursuit of permanent residency
by weaker candidates via temporary visa subclasses, including the Temporary Graduate
visa 485 introduced in 2007.
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Data description and harmonisation.Table 5 Description of variables considered for analysis (dependent variables)
Variables Description and harmonisation (if any)
At work Whether the person is currently working in a job, business or farm. The wording
of the survey questions varies, with CSAM referring explicitly to a “paid job” and
LSIA 3 referring only to a “job”. It is therefore possible that respondents working
as (unpaid) family workers, for example, would report themselves as employed in
LSIA 3 but not in CSAM. To control for this possibility, we excluded the (few)
observations in LSIA 3 where respondents stated that they had a job with zero
earnings. This distinction had no impact on our results.
Highly skilled occupations Whether the person works in highly skilled occupations (dummy). We consider
2 possible groupings of highly skilled occupations based on the 1 digit
ANZSCO classification. Highly skilled occupations are defined as “managers and
professionals”, or as “managers, professionals and technical and trades” in the
sensitivity analysis.
Occupation codes at the 4-digit level are reported by LSIA 3 and CSAM
and for respondents who are at work. The classification of occupations,
however, changed from ASCO in LSIA3 to ANZSCO in CSAM. Translation
tables are provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics at the 4 digit
occupation level. These tables were used to recode the ASCO codes
reported by LSIA 3 into ANZSCO codes. To ensure the highest possible
degree of comparability between the major occupation groups (1 digit
level) in ASCO and ANZSCO, further attention was devoted to the 35
instances where the 4 digit ASCO codes can be translated into several 4
digit ANZSCO codes that spanned 2 or more 1 digit occupation groups in
ANZSCO. This situation concerned 19% of people at work in LSIA3.
For example, ASCO 2231 (Computing Professionals) can be translated into
ANZSCO 1351 (ICT Managers), ANZSCO 2611–33 (ICT Business and Systems
Analysts and other ICT professionals) or ANZSCO 3131 (ICT Support
Technicians). Allocating the ASCO 2231 code reported by LSIA 3 is therefore
complicated by the fact that we do not know to which of the three
constituent ANZSCO codes any individual belongs. Furthermore, this choice
will affect whether Computing Professionals (people with ASCO 2231) in LSIA3
end up working as Managers (group 1), Professionals (group 2) or as
Technicians (groups 3) in the ANSCO classification used in CSAM. We
addressed this issue by analysing the distribution across the constituent
ANZSCO codes of observations reported by CSAM (in conjunction with the
label of the occupation in ASCO. In the example above, CSAM reports 3 ICT
managers, no ICT technicians, and 173 respondents classified as ICT
professionals. In this case, we therefore allocated all observations with ASCO
2231 to ANZSCO 2611 (ICT professionals). Prima facie evidence in support of
this approach is given by the close similarities between the population
distributions of the ANZSCO codes imputed from LSIA 3 data and those
reported by CSAM data for Family Stream migrants, as reported in Table 1.
Visa categories Based on their visa number, respondents are classified into 6 visa categories.
1) Family visa (family)
2) Family/State/Territory sponsored visas (GSM)
3) Independent visas (GSM)
4) Employer visa, incl. LA and ENS (employer sponsored)
5) Business and distinguished talents visas (excluded from the analysis)
6) Graduate visas, temporary – only in CSAM (excluded from the analysis)
Covariates Variable description and harmonisation (if any)
Age bands Constructed from age, where age is defined as the difference between the
year of the survey and the year of birth (year defined as 2005 for LSIA3, 2009
for CSAM cohort 1, and 2010 for CSAM cohort 2)
• 18 – 24
• 25 – 34
• 35 – 44
• 45 – 54
Table 5 Description of variables considered for analysis (dependent variables) (Continued)
Male male = 1; female = 0
Has a partner Dummy variable. Equal to 1 if the respondent has a partner either in Australia
or abroad. This question is asked directly in LSIA3. In CSAM the related
question is whether the respondent applied to migrate with a partner. Other
questions in CSAM ask about “the current relationship status” with their
migrating partner, or about details of their “current partner”. These questions
were used to impute a partner variable consistent with the question directly
asked in LSIA3.
Partner working in Australia Dummy variable. Whether the respondent currently has a partner who is at
work in Australia. Exclude cases where the partner is at work abroad. Question
directly asked in LSIA3. In CSAM, the labour market question refers to the
respondent’s current partner without specifying their geographic location.
From this we exclude cases where respondents report that their partner has
not yet arrived in Australia to ensure greater consistency with the wording
used in the question in LSIA3.
Number of children who
migrated with PA
The number of the respondent’s children who migrated to Australia with the
respondents (Primary Applicant) and are still living with the respondent. This
variable imperfectly account for the number of children living in the
household with the respondent. This definition captures the only common
information regarding children, between the two surveys. Another related
variable “Child in HH likely” was constructed for the sensitivity analysis, see
below.
Has children who migrated Dummy version of the variable above, except that it is coded 0/1 on whether
there are children or not.
Child in HH likely Dummy variable. Uses all the information available in each survey to impute
whether a child is likely to be present in the respondent’s household. This
includes information on the respondent’s and partner’s details of social
benefits (child care rebate, parenting payments, etc.). Variable used in the
sensitivity analysis only
Highest qualification Refers to the highest post-school qualification obtained (in Australia or abroad).
In LSIA3 the question was asked directly. In CSAM, respondents were asked
about their highest qualification as well as their highest Australian qualification.
Whichever qualification was highest was used in this case. Qualifications were
harmonised under the following groups: a
1) No post school qualification (incl. no schooling)
2) AQF Certificate I-IV and other; AQF level 1–4
3) Diploma and advanced diplomas; AQF level 5–6
4) Bachelor and post-graduate Diploma (together in LSIA); AQF level 7–8
5) Master’s level degree; AQF level 9
6) Doctorate; AQF level 10
Highest qualification obtained
in Australia
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the highest qualification was obtained
in Australia.
State Current state of residence: ACT, NSW, NT, QLD, SA, TAS, VIC, WA
On-shore visa application Dummy variable: visa application onshore = 1
English proficiency Respondents’ self-reported spoken English proficiency. Exactly the same question
format and wording was used by both LSIA2 and CSAM. Answers were classified
into three groups:
1) Very well (including English reported as best language spoken)
2) Well
3) Not well or not at all
Reason for migrating Reason for migrating to Australia. The question uses the exact same wording
in LSIA3 and CSAM. The possible answers are
1) Better future for family
2) A higher standard of living
3) Australia’s features – beaches, climate, lifestyle, etc.,
4) To join family or relatives
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Table 5 Description of variables considered for analysis (dependent variables) (Continued)
5) Work or business opportunities
Region of birth Variable constructed from the reported country of birth. The regions considered
are:
• Born in an English speaking country (Australia, Canada, Ireland Republic,
New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, or the United States)
• Born in East Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, South Korea,
North Korea, or Taiwan)
• Born in South Asia (Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka)
• Born in South East Asia (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, or Vietnam)
• Born in the rest of the world
Current housing arrangement The same question (exact words) was asked in both surveys but the choice of
answers was worded slightly differently
1) Owns home outright
2) Mortgage
3) Renting
4) Lives with relatives
5) other
Has a partner in Australia Dummy variable. Whether the respondent has a partner in Australia. Excluded
observations here respondent states having a partner abroad.
Time in Australia Dummy variable. Equal to 1 if in Australia for 1.5 years or more. The comparability
of this variable between LSIA and CSAM is questionable due to differences in the
data that each survey reports.
aAQF denotes “Australian Qualifications Framework”
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